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Abstract—Owing to a number of reasons, the deployment of 
encryption solutions are beginning to be ubiquitous at both 
organizational and individual levels. The most emphasized reason 
is the necessity to ensure confidentiality of privileged 
information. Unfortunately, it is also popular as cyber-criminals' 
escape route from the grasp of digital forensic investigations. The 
direct encryption of data or indirect encryption of storage 
devices, more often than not, prevents access to such information 
contained therein. This consequently leaves the forensics 
investigation team, and subsequently the prosecution, little or no 
evidence to work with, in sixty percent of such cases. However, it 
is unthinkable to jeopardize the successes brought by encryption 
technology to information security, in favour of digital forensics 
technology. This paper examines what data encryption 
contributes to information security, and then highlights its 
contributions to digital forensics of disk drives. The paper also 
discusses the available ways and tools, in digital forensics, to get 
around the problems constituted by encryption. A particular 
attention is paid to the Truecrypt encryption solution to illustrate 
ideas being discussed. It then compares encryption's 
contributions in both realms, to justify the need for introduction 
of new technologies to forensically defeat data encryption as the 
only solution, whilst maintaining the privacy goal of users. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Data is becoming largely existent in today's world than 
they were anticipated some three decades ago [1]. Individuals 
are keeping lot more amount of information than organizations 
kept in the yesteryears. Significant amounts of such 
information are valued and consequently preferred to be 
known to them alone. Such valued information includes their 
financial details, medical records, locations, as well as 
professional and network information. Businesses and 
organizations possess larger amounts of information than 
individuals. A good amount of such information is critical to 
their sustained existence and growth. Their intellectual 
properties and trade secrets are kept away from potential 
exploits, thus, considered very private. Governments and 
agencies keep sensitive information that may affect the 
stability of their jurisdictions, politically or economically, if 
divulged.  
   The necessity to keep such information within the 
required confines describes a component purpose of 
Information Security, which involves the totality of activities 
to ensure the protection of information assets that use, store, or 
transmit information from risk through the application of 
policies, education, training, awareness, and technology [2]. 
Data security involves the consideration of potential 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability threats to data 
services, using functions such as identification, authentication, 
authorization and audit [3].  
   An important and popular methodology for enforcing 
information security is encryption, which is itself an element 
of cryptography. Cryptography provides a secret 
communication mechanism between two or more parties. 
Symmetric and Public Key Cryptography employ various 
algorithms to ensure the security of data items 'at rest', 'in use', 
and 'in motion'. 
   Data encryption may not be an explicit solution to 
information security problems, as organizations remain 
increasingly vulnerable to data breach incidents, but it is still 
the most efficient fix when deployed adequately [4]. This has 
led to the growing availability of full disk encryption tools. 
Disk manufacturers are embedding full encryption tools into 
their products, making encryption more available for use [5].  
   The study conducted by [4] showed the increased usage 
of full disk, virtual volume, native disk, and flash drive 
encryptions over two years. However, for reasons other than 
the cost of deployment and managing an encryption solution, 
some organizations have shunned or still undecided about 
adopting encryption solutions. They insisted that “availability 
is more important than confidentiality” [6]. The time the 
encryption and decryption processes take before data is made 
accessible to potential users may cause delay in organizations' 
operations, depending on how complex the base algorithm is. 
Such delays may escalate to a sort of denial-of-service 
situation, which may be adverse to organizations' businesses. 
On the electronic discovery front, unavailability problem 
prevents anticipated investigation of cyber-incidents [7] 
The rest of this paper is organized thus: Section 2 presents 
the reason for this work. Section 3 highlights the contributions 
of data encryption to information security and digital 
forensics. Section 4 discusses the effects of data encryption on 
digital forensics processes, as well as the currently improvised 
digital forensics methods to defeat data encryption issues. In 
section 5, justifications for new technologies to help forensic 
investigation of encrypted data containers are discussed. 
Conclusions are given is Section 6.      
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II. NECESSITY & SCOPE 
Surveys revealed the continuously increasing adoption of 
cryptographic solutions by organizations for various data 
security platforms within the last five years [6]. The report of 
the surveys infers the anticipation of non-users to adopt partial 
or holistic cryptographic solutions in the nearest future. This 
suggests the impending domination by cryptographic 
procedures, to protect information in the computer world. 
There are ways for investigators to outmaneuver the use of 
cryptography as a provocation to digital forensics processes. 
These methods are either by legally obtaining appropriate 
'search and seize' authorizations or tactically planning to catch 
the offender unawares and hence, access live – running and 
unencrypted – systems [5]. However, only a handful of 
encryption incidents encountered by investigators have been 
solved using those methods. The larger lot of about 60% often 
does not get prosecuted, not because they were missed, but 
because nothing could be done to access the potential evidence 
[8][9]. An instance is the case of Brazilian banker Daniel 
Dantas, whose strong truecrypt passphrase has foiled all 
attempts by Brazilian police and FBI to access his encrypted 
potential evidential hard drives [10][11].  
The inconsistency of legal systems across boundaries does 
not make the process easier, as laws may or may not enjoin 
perpetrators to help the investigators access the encrypted 
medium [12]. This was evident in the Dantas' suspected 
money laundering case, where Brazil had no legislation to 
make him reveal his passphrase or encryption type, unlike the 
United Kingdom [11]. Therefore, researchers and developers 
need to be reminded of privacy-enforcement threats to forensic 
investigations, and pestered about the need for technologies to 
help deal with accessing encrypted storage devices.    
III. ENCRYPTION CONTRIBUTIONS 
A. Data Encryption for Information Security 
In order to examine threats contributed by a technology, 
the solutions it offers should be considered too [13]. 
Encryption, as an element of cryptography, is a methodology 
for achieving information security, through secretive 
communications [14]. 
   The United Kingdom's Data Protection Act 1998 most 
suitably describes the confidentiality element of information 
security. It seeks to ensure that the information held by 
organizations of their customers and employees are 
safeguarded from other uses than they were obtained [15]. 
This is meant to avert incidents such as identity crimes, and 
protect such potential victims from damages and 
embarrassment that unauthorized use of their data may cause 
[16]. The powers conferred on the Information 
Commissioner's Office (ICO) and the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) to spot check and fine defaulting 
organizations, as well as the necessity for card-accepting 
organizations to comply with industry standards, like the 
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS), has 
led to the increasing adoption of encryption solutions [6].  
There is also a huge necessity to ensure the confidentiality 
of data items, at rest, in use, or in motion [17]. Financial 
organizations, where transactions are regularly performed on 
data, have to ensure that such data are not subject to 
unauthorized access or modifications. The combination of the 
encryption and hash technologies to create digital signatures 
and certificates, which are used to ensure data confidentiality 
and integrity, is a laudable approach [18]. 
As far as information security is concerned, data 
encryption technology has been of invaluable success on the 
confidentiality and integrity fronts. Whereas on the availability 
front, it is known for delays on sparse occasions. Serious 
availability issues caused by the deployment of encryption 
solutions are not unheard of, although they are usually 
addressable by providers [19]. In an overall sense, it is hence, 
agreeable to regard data encryption as a massive solution for 
information security challenges. 
B. Data Encryption for Digital Forensics 
During their hard disk sanitization study at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology's Laboratory, [14] found out the ease 
with which data can be retrieved from disk drives. The ability 
to recover deleted data and locate hidden data was not a 
challenge, because there were forensic tools that require little 
or no specialized user training in existence. The success of 
those tools was attributed to the “widespread failure of the 
market to adopt encryption technology” [14]. Some eight 
years after his work at the MIT laboratory, [20] admitted that 
the current forensic tools are struggling to be useful to digital 
forensics investigators when certain data are concerned. He 
stressed the increasing occurrence of such data and identified 
format incompatibilities, encryption and lack of training as the 
reasons. [21] Highlighted data scalability and encryption as 
some of the unaddressed issues too. 
Encryption of data on disk drives is implemented at the file 
system encryption and full disk encryption (bitstream) levels. 
At the file system encryption level, individual files are 
encrypted with separate keys. Although the file system 
encryption protects virtually all the files in a disk drive, other 
data outside the file system are omitted. Full disk encryption 
secures data on disk drives with a single symmetric key. Full 
disk encryption protects data in all areas of the disk drive, 
including areas outside the file system. Such data are the 
hidden files, swap files, file metadata, temporary files and 
caches, registry files, and boot sector data [22][23][24][25]. 
The preservation and acquisition of an encrypted disk drive 
can be tricky, depending on the power state, level, and type of 
encryption used – hardware-based or software-based [5]. It 
may be easier to preserve and acquire a file system-encrypted 
disk drive than a fully-encrypted disk drive in the powered off 
state. Likewise, the acquisition of a software-implemented and 
fully-encrypted disk drive may be easier than a hardware-
implemented and file system-encrypted disk drive. Acquisition 
may be totally impossible in cases where disk is not accessible 
[8].  
The examination and analysis phases of digital forensics 
investigation suffer the most from encryption technology. 
Reference [7] explained that there may be a possibility to 
recover an encrypted data, but it is often impossible to process 
the data. An examiner's tool needs access to read the contents 
of the encrypted data to be processed. However, they 
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downplayed the threat posed to digital forensics by stating the 
possibility to circumvent encryption technology, even though 
it may be time-consuming and luck-dependent.    
IV. DATA ENCRYPTION TOOLS AND KNOWN FORENSICS 
MANOEUVRING METHODS 
There are numerous data encryption solutions for disk 
drives. Each solution addresses data protection and privacy 
requirements using different methods. Some encryption 
solutions are compatible with particular operating systems, 
unlike others who are portable. They protect data at different 
levels and employ different key management and 
authentication methods. Most encryption solutions are 
implemented as software, but hardware-based solutions are 
preferred by some organizations [25]. Here is a list of popular 
disk drive encryption solutions: Microsoft's BitLocker, 
Symantec's PGP, Apple's FileVault, WinMagic's SecureDoc, 
IronKey's D200, RSA Data Security's RSA SecurPC, and 
McAfee's Endpoint [25][26][27]. However, the TrueCrypt 
solution has been briefly examined in this paper because of its 
immensely controversial reputation and gross utilization 
[8][9][22].  
Although investigators are not entirely incapacitated by 
data encryption, sometimes it is down to the legal system to 
help get access to evidential data [7]. They stated that 
perpetrators used to employ the file-system encryption 
because they are concerned only about the data that are 
incriminating in their own opinions. The other areas left 
unencrypted usually contain sufficient evidence to prosecute 
them.  
However, the threat posed by a full disk encryption 
solution is more detrimental to digital forensics processes. But 
as the saying goes that “no machine is 100% efficient”, these 
encryption solutions have some exploitable vulnerabilities. 
The encryption status seizes to hold for all data on the 
entire disk from the point the symmetric key has been 
accepted by the system until it is shut down. Deductively, data 
becomes accessible and inaccessible when the system is 
powered on and off respectively [7][25]. Digital forensics 
investigators need to execute an authorized and well-planned 
“search and seizure”, with the aim of catching the perpetrator 
unawares while his system is running. 
   Another way to circumvent the threat is the traditional 
search for the encryption key [25]. There is a possibility, no 
matter how unlikely, that the key to decrypt the disk drive is 
written on a notepad or stored in USB drive somewhere at the 
scene. 
Advanced memory-based procedures are also used to 
overcome the encryption threat. The concept of the full disk 
encryption that decrypts and makes data available for use is a 
memory function. The encryption key is stored in the memory 
the first time it was supplied. It remains in the memory and is 
used to automatically decrypt required data until the system is 
powered off. Various techniques can be used to retrieve the 
encryption key from the memory. RAMs hold data for few 
seconds to minutes – extendable by keeping the RAM cooled 
– without power. They can then be accessed through dedicated 
tools, such as MoonSol's Windows Memory, GMG Systems' 
KnTList, Passware or F-Response. However, tools such as 
Wiebetech's HotPlug can be used to transfer the running 
system to a back-up power supply in case required expertise is 
not available and seized system needs to be moved to a 
laboratory [5]. 
A. The TrueCrypt Scenario 
TrueCrypt was first released in 2004, as a privacy-
enforcing solution by the TrueCrypt Foundation. It is a very 
sturdy, free and open-source software solution, which allows 
intentional or accidental (sudden power outage), partial or full 
encryption and decryption processes, without compromising 
its data security ability. Several encryption algorithms used by 
TrueCrypt to encrypt data include Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES), TwoFish, Serpent, AES-Twofish, Serpent-
AES, AES-Twofish-Serpent, Twofish-Serpent, and Serpent-
Twofish-AES. The PIPEMD-160, SHA-512 or Whirlpool hash 
algorithms, with a Random Number Generator, are used to 
create key-files for stronger security. TrueCrypt is capable of 
running in a portable mode, without being installed on the 
target disk drive. It supports smart cards and tokens for added 
security level and provides hot-keys to perform encryption 
tasks swiftly. It encrypts data in a partition/drive as a whole, or 
in a file-hosted container [5][9][22][24][27][28][29]. 
1) Challenges Posed by TrueCrypt 
TrueCrypt employs both the file-system and full-disk 
encryption methods. This ensures that all data, including 
registry entries, swap space, file metadata, temporary files, and 
hidden data are protected from unauthorized access. This 
leaves investigators with the options to plan a surprise access 
to a running system, search for possibly exposed encryption 
key, or use advanced memory-fetching techniques for keys or 
data [9][24][29]. 
TrueCrypt is an on-the-fly-encryption (OTFE)-based 
software. This concept ensures that only the data required by 
the user is available for access. All data are encrypted from the 
onset. The required data is copied into the memory and 
decrypted for use there. As such, the data on the disk drive 
remain encrypted. Once the data being processed by the user 
has changed and need to be saved to disk, TrueCrypt encrypts 
and saves it to the disk. Further, restricting investigators' 
access methods to those highlighted earlier [24]. 
Plausible deniability is a feature confidently boasted by 
TrueCrypt. The encrypted volume/drive appears as a drive 
with random data. A suspicious reaction to the randomness can 
be quashed with an explanation of a normal wipe process that 
fills drive with random data. This plausible deniability is 
possible because TrueCrypt does not have any signature that 
would be otherwise found in the drive's partition table 
[5][24][28][29].  
It also allows volumes and operating systems to be hidden 
inside a visible TrueCrypt volume. The hidden volume is 
encrypted by a different key than the volume which contains 
it. It resides within the illusional random data created by the 
encryption of the visible volume. The user choses the volume 
to mount for use by the encryption key he supplies. If the legal 
system forces him to disclose his encryption key, he can 
disclose the key for the encrypted volume alone. The hidden 
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volume, which will usually contain evidential information, 
remains oblivious to investigators [24][30].  
A case example was a suspected terrorist, whose laptop 
was turned on and had the TrueCrypt mount window 
displayed. After initial refusal to disclose the encryption key, a 
High Court order requested he did. The case was dismissed 
later on, as no evidence could be gathered by the 
investigation/prosecution team against him (5). It is suffice to 
say that the suspected terrorist might have supplied the outer 
encrypted volume's key rather than the hidden volume's key. 
The plausible deniability feature of TrueCrypt proves to be a 
higher defeat to the three get-around digital forensics methods 
currently being used. Since, the TrueCrypt encryption solution 
is a widely available free software, experienced cyber-
criminals will continue to use the features to avoid being 
prosecuted. 
The following section looks at possible counter-actions to 
the robustness offered by encryption solutions for disk drives.  
V. MUTED SOLUTIONS TO DATA ENCRYPTION THREATS 
Reference [8] highlighted two possible solutions to the 
forensics threats posed by inaccessible information containers. 
The first was the collaboration of digital forensics experts and 
storage device manufacturers to develop and implement a 
standard back-door across all storage devices. 
This would seem the perfect solution, but Forte thought it 
was an excessive ask and “very unlikely to succeed”. Three 
years on, there has not been any such collaboration or 
development. Forte pointed that the other solution involves a 
cooperation of the parties involved in an incident towards the 
adjustment of evidence preservation and analysis 
methodologies. He however admitted that the latter is only 
possible in e-discovery processes where both parties may be 
willing to cooperate rather than cyber-crime incidents whose 
subjects are often reluctant. Undecided about what solution 
was more feasible, even though the former seemed more 
effective, [8] believed there was enough time to find solutions 
before encrypted storage containers become pervasive, and as 
sort lightened the push for the former solution.  
Reference [24] itself, highlighted that physical or remote 
(by malware or rootkit) access to such truecrypt-protected 
computer can compromise the encryption. The access may be 
used to install keyloggers and memory capturing software or 
hardware devices. These devices can obtain the encryption 
keys and passwords, as well as the unencrypted data which 
could be decrypted using acquired keys. Kleissner's “stoned” 
bootkit is a particular example of rootkit that can give such 
access to a target computer. It infects and controls the master 
boot record of the truecrypt program, and consequently allows 
the user to bypass the full volume encryption feature of 
truecrypt to access data resident on the computer [31]. 
However, the law enforcement agencies would be breaching 
the privacy rights of such individuals if physical or remote 
access to their computer is gained without their consent. A 
situation where law enforcement agencies have legal right to 
physically and remotely access a target computer is the sex 
offender monitoring case, in which the offender has actually 
been convicted of the crime. Unfortunately, a yet-to-be-
convicted suspect that has actually committed a cybercrime 
will ordinarily not give such approval. He may also protect 
himself with the self-incrimination legal clause. Yet again, 
privacy needs have rendered another potentially-viable 
solution illegal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The effectiveness of data encryption as a mechanism for 
enforcing information privacy is massive. This is evident by 
the reported widespread use of various data encryption 
solutions at the organizational and individual levels. However, 
its huge success for data access restriction has been a threat for 
digital forensics processes over the years. Cyber-criminals 
have been exploiting the information confidentiality ability of 
data encryption solutions, to restrict digital forensics 
investigators' accesses to potential evidence. The ubiquitous 
availability, inexpensive cost and easy implementation of 
encryption solutions enhance the threats posed to digital 
forensics processes. Investigators sometimes get around the 
encryption challenge through careful and thoughtful planning 
of search and seizure, thorough search for exposed encryption 
keys, and advanced in-memory data retrieval techniques. Yet, 
a minimum of 60% of computer incidents involving data-
encryption end up unprosecutable.  
The TrueCrypt software went even further by providing 
users with plausible deniability and non-repudiation abilities. 
This makes digital forensics investigations of encrypted disk 
drives harder and less feasible. Consequently, this undesired 
situation constitutes an indirect reason for the rise in 
occurrence of computer incidents. As much as data encryption 
helps offenders get away from being caught, the necessity for 
data privacy and security cannot be sacrificed for digital 
forensics. Unfortunately, the only digital forensics solution to 
a threatening information security solution will have to be 
unanimously considered by disk drive manufacturers. There 
should be a technology that will provide a backdoor for digital 
forensics investigators to gain access to the most securely 
encrypted disk drives. However, there will have to be a 
restriction to the distribution of such technology when it 
comes to existence. This is to avoid its abuse by non-law 
enforcement practitioners (and potential computer criminals) 
to illegally access target data. 
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